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FORCED PRESERVATION: ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND THE BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY 
EXCEPTION 
 
Michael H. Dore1 
 
To be admissible under the hearsay rule’s business records 
exception set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), the record in 
question must have been “kept in the ordinary course of a regularly 
conducted business activity.”  Many electronic records, however, remain 
in a company’s files only because the company had a duty to preserve 
them once it reasonably anticipated litigation or a government subpoena.  
The company otherwise typically would have deleted those electronically 
stored data in the regular operation of its business to make room on its 
burdened servers.  This Article argues that such presumptive deletion 
undermines the trustworthiness and reliability of a business record, and 
thus the rationale of Rule 803(6).  Courts should therefore focus on the 
unique elements of the creation and preservation of electronic evidence, 
and consider whether a company truly kept the record at issue in the 
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There are some things we cannot throw away.  Of course, we have items in our 
lives that we actually want to keep.  But, whether it is an unwanted gift from a spouse’s 
parent or a mattress tag, there seem to be just as many things that, for reasons either 
implicit or explicit, we simply are not allowed to get rid of.  We do not want or use them.  
We keep them because we have to.   
The same can be said for the vast majority of electronic data that companies 
create every day.  Many of these data never would have existed decades ago; if the 
communication happened at all, today’s email chain once might have taken the form of 
an unrecorded phone call or water cooler conversation.  And, according to standard 
company procedures, many of these same data eventually are deleted to make room on 
overflowing company servers for the rush of new data.  But when a company reasonably 
anticipates a government investigation or civil litigation, for example, it must stop that 
automatic deletion and abide by its duty to preserve potentially relevant materials.2  This 
Article addresses whether such preserved materials—particularly emails—can be 
considered “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” under the 
business records hearsay exception.3 
As one district court has noted, “[t]he touchstone of admissibility under Rule 
803(6) is reliability.”4  Indeed, a key premise of the business records exception is that 
records that satisfy the rule’s requirements are trustworthy because businesses depend on 
them to conduct their everyday affairs.5  But the extent to which businesses rely on 
certain records, like emails, is much less clear now than it might have been in the past.  
Similarly, the exponential increase in contemporary businesses’ use of written 
communications also calls into question the “habits of precision” and “systematic 
checking” that the 1972 advisory committee notes to Rule 803 cite to justify the business 
records exception.6   
Technology is the main reason for this evolution.  Because of technological 
advances like email, mobile devices, and VPN access from a home computer to a 
business network, employees now create many more work-related communications than 
in the past.  And the vast majority of these electronic written communications are far less 
formal and “precise” than their hard copy analogues.  On the back end, technology is the 
                                                
2  See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002) (punishing destruction of documents or other materials in 
“contemplation” of federal investigation). 
3  Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
4   Giles v. Rhodes, No. 94 Civ. 6385 (CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13980, at *25 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2000). 
5  See generally Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note (explaining that business 
records may possess “unusual reliability” in part because businesses actually rely on them). 
6  See id. 





reason why businesses initially preserve many electronic records—in email inboxes, 
“sent items” folders, and on backup tapes―that they otherwise would have tossed away, 
or never created in the first place.  The problem for many lawyers is that technology is 
also the reason why these records typically disappear after a relatively short period of 
time.  
The duty to preserve evidence is more important now than ever before because in 
just about every circumstance a litigator now is working against the clock to prevent his 
or her client’s electronic records from being deleted.  Because businesses create so many 
records, they typically automatically delete records after a set period of time to preserve 
space on their servers. This automatic deletion runs headlong into the duty to preserve 
evidence, which attaches “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation.”7   Thus, one 
of the first things a lawyer must do when his or her client anticipates litigation is to 
suspend the client’s “routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 
‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”8  This duty to 
preserve evidence prevents the regular deletion of a business’s electronic records so they 
can be subject to discovery and use at trial.   
Many litigants argue that such records are admissible under the Rule 803(6) 
business records hearsay exception, which, again, is premised on the purported reliability 
of records created and kept in the course of the business’s affairs.  But if a business had 
no intention of keeping a record, and thus relying on it in the future, then any 
presumption of its reliability is compromised.  The existence of the record in the 
company’s files in that instance is attributable to litigation activity, 
not “business activity.”  Of course, the proponent of the evidence can offer reasons why 
the record still might satisfy Rule 803(6)’s requirements, and a different hearsay 
exception might make the record admissible.  Nevertheless, the impact of preservation 
obligations on the continued existence of “business records” is an important 
consideration for a more faithful application of the rule.   
Unfortunately, no court has addressed the impact of the duty to preserve evidence 
on Rule 803(6)’s requirements.  This is not for lack of opportunity.  According to one 
district court, “[t]he business record exception is one of the hearsay exceptions most 
discussed by courts when ruling on the admissibility of electronic evidence.”9  These 
decisions “demonstrate a continuum running from cases where the court was very lenient 
in admitting electronic business records, without demanding analysis, to those in which 
the court took a very demanding approach and scrupulously analyzed every element of 
the exception, and excluded evidence when all were not met.”10  Even the courts that 
have taken the most demanding approach, however, have not focused on the role of a 
                                                
7  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
8   Id. 
9  Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 572 (D. Md. 2007). 
10  Id. 





company’s duty to preserve electronically stored data on a given record’s presence in the 
company files.   
The courts that have most scrutinized the admissibility of electronic evidence, and 
of emails in particular, under Rule 803(6) have focused on the circumstances of the 
record’s creation.  A major issue, for example, has been the employee’s motivation in 
preparing the record.  That is, did the employee create the record because he or she 
thought it was worth doing or because business policy dictated it?  One district court 
summarized the state of the law on this contested issue as follows: “[i]t is not enough that 
a particular employee regularly makes and keeps the records as his or her own regular 
practice because it must be the regular practice of the business (i.e., the ‘regularly 
conducted activity’) to make and keep the record at issue.”11   
This analysis traces back to the touchstone issue of “reliability” underlying Rule 
803(6).  As another district court noted, “[c]ourts admit hearsay statements which are 
grouped under Fed. R. Evid. 803 because of the supposed reliability of the out of court 
statements themselves,” and “[o]ne guarantee of that reliability is that the record was 
made in the course of a routine business practice.”12  By contrast, according to one court, 
“documents that are created solely at the author’s discretion raise motivational concerns 
and lack the reliability and trustworthiness that business records are ordinarily assumed to 
have.”13 
Regardless of why someone originally created the record, however, none of these 
cases has discussed the reliability of a record that, but for the litigation, the business 
would have permanently deleted in the normal course of business.  In many cases, the 
document offered as an admissible business record exists not because it was the 
employee’s practice to keep the record, nor even because it was the business’s practice to 
keep the record.  Rather, the business saved the record from automatic deletion only 
because someone else threatened to sue, which triggered the business’s duty to preserve 
evidence.  This non-business reason for keeping a record that the business otherwise 
would permanently delete undermines the record’s reliability and calls into question 
whether the business kept it in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.   
No court has addressed this issue, and thus even the most stringent applications of Rule 
803(6) have been far too broad. 
The overbroad application of the business records exception makes the exception 
unique in that the government/plaintiff is as responsible for the existence of a given 
record as the person who originally drafted it.  By bringing suit, or even threatening to do 
so, a litigant can impose on another party a duty to preserve electronically stored 
                                                
11  Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
12  United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 1995) and Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 945 (1st Cir. 
1989)). 
13  Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 544, 566 (2003), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 407 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 





materials that most corporate computer systems would otherwise erase.  Such records 
should not be considered to have been “kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity” when the ordinary operation of that business would be to delete them 
forever.   
This issue is particularly important in white collar actions against individuals, 
given the government’s typical incentive to advocate for the broadest possible reading of 
the business records exception.  In an action between two companies, each side could 
benefit from a loose reading of the rule to admit the other side’s harmful emails.  In a 
government action, however, the document production is largely one-sided, although the 
importance of documents from third parties might impact the equation in certain cases.  
Often, it is in the government’s interest to pursue a broadly applicable reading of Rule 
803(6) because the government has little to lose; such an approach merely sweeps in 
additional incriminating emails that otherwise might not be admissible.  For example, the 
government could use emails authored by mid-level employees against certain targeted 
executives.        
Part I of this Article provides general background on the business records 
exception and its underlying rationale that business records are trustworthy and reliable.  
Part II addresses the Federal Rules’ recognition of the routine deletion of information in 
the ordinary use of computer systems, and the duty to preserve such materials that 
attaches in both criminal and civil actions.  Part III discusses courts’ application of the 
business records exception, particularly in the context of emails, and the courts’ limited 
analysis of the “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” prong of 
Rule 803(6).  Finally, Part IV concludes that a stricter application of the business records 
exception is necessary based on the text of Rule 803(6) and the inherently diminished 
reliability of records that a business would automatically delete absent litigation.   
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RULE 803(6) BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY 
EXCEPTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.”14  One frequently-invoked exception to this rule is 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), often referred to as the “business records exception.”  
Under Rule 803(6), the hearsay rule does not exclude from admission into evidence:  
 
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or 
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record 
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 
902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
                                                
14  Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 





source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness.15 
 
Broken into more manageable elements, one district court has stated: 
 
[T]o admit a document under the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule, the party seeking admission must lay a foundation through the 
testimony of  a “custodian” or other “qualified witness” that: 1) the 
declarant in the records had knowledge to make accurate statements; 2) 
the record was made at the time of the event recorded; 3) it was the regular 
practice of the business to make the record; and 4) the record was kept in 
the regular course of business.16   
 
The business records exception is rooted in the view that records that satisfy its 
requirements generally are trustworthy.  They are considered trustworthy because, as one 
court of appeals has noted, “businesses depend on such records to conduct their own 
affairs; accordingly, the employees who generate them have a strong motive to be 
accurate and none to be deceitful.”17  The 1972 advisory committee notes to Rule 803 
likewise describe the rationale underlying the business records exception as: 
 
the element of unusual reliability . . . said variously to be supplied by 
systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of 
precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a 
duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or 
occupation.18 
 
Today, though, a company’s duty to preserve emails in anticipation of litigation calls into 
question the reason a document remains in the company’s files, and thus its 
trustworthiness and reliability.     
                                                
15  Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
16  United States v. Adibe, No. 08-42-JJF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80315, at *4-5 (D. Del. 
Sept. 3, 2009) (citing United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
17  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 205 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir.1993)) (noting also that “routine 
and habitual patterns of creation” contribute to reliability). 
18  Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
98-1233 (CKK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (“The justification 
for this exception is that business records have a high degree of accuracy because the nation’s 
business demands it, because the records are customarily checked for correctness, and because 
recordkeepers are trained in habits of precision.”) (quoting U.S. v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982)). 





III. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
Companies are growing more and more dependent on electronically stored data 
rather than paper records.  This increasing reliance on electronic records has created a 
host of complications for lawyers because companies generally delete these records as a 
matter of course.19  Thus, a lawyer must determine exactly when a duty to preserve 
electronically stored data is triggered.   
There is limited case law or statutory law that addresses this issue in the criminal 
context.  The Sarbannes-Oxley Act of 2002 is one rare example; it imposes a duty to 
preserve records even before the government files an action, when it is merely in 
“contemplation” of that action.20  A similar principle applies in civil litigation, where the 
case law is much more developed.   
Civil cases addressing electronically stored data preservation generally follow the 
lead of Judge Shira Scheindlin’s seminal orders in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC.21  In 
that case, equities trader Laura Zubulake sued her former employer, UBS, for, among 
other things, gender discrimination.22  Numerous discovery issues arose, and 
Judge Scheindlin comprehensively analyzed such things as when the duty to preserve 
electronic evidence arises and which party should bear the costs of production associated 
with various types of electronically stored data.23  According to Judge Scheindlin, 
“[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation 
of routine documents.”24  In other cases involving electronically stored data, and in cases 
involving the preservation of data generally, this is the required practice.25   
                                                
19  See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note (2006) (recodified as Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 36(e), April 30, 2007) (noting that “[t]he ‘routine operation’ of computer systems 
includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator’s specific 
direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents,” and that 
“[s]uch features are essential to the operation of electronic information systems”). 
20  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002). 
21  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
22   Zubulake v. Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
23  See Zubulake v. Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
24   Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
25  See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 195 (D.S.C. 2008) (“[A] party has a duty 
to preserve evidence during litigation and at any time ‘before the litigation when a party 
reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.’”) (quoting 
Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)). 





Of course, the obligation to preserve documents in the event of impending 
litigation is not new; this duty existed long before the advent of electronically stored 
data.26  But a few key elements of data preservation are new.  For example, email has 
made written communication the dominant mode of interaction between most workers, 
even in informal work situations.  Blackberries and instant messaging, which allow 
workers to communicate even when away from their desks, are just a few of the 
technological advancements expanding the realm of discoverable written 
communications.  These communications have not simply put into writing the “chit-chat 
that would be expected to occur on the phone or during a visit to a colleague’s office.”27  
They have facilitated, and thereby increased, necessary communications in the course of 
business.  As a result, the number of communications that might be “business records” 
has grown exponentially.   
Another important development relates to how businesses keep their records.  In 
the past, there was a level of formality associated with written communications that made 
it more likely that any written communication subject to preservation in anticipation of 
litigation would have been retained anyway as part of the business’s affairs.  In a general 
sense, if a communication was important, it was written down.  If it was important 
enough to be written down, it was maintained in the company’s hard copy files.  Today, 
however, electronic communications occur with far more frequency and informality; 
businesses record them automatically (and at least initially maintain them) upon sending 
or receipt no matter how “important” these communications are.  In essence, 
communication and saving written material to company files have combined into one act.   
This highlights another major difference between today’s document preservation 
regime and that of the past.  In today’s electronic world, there is “routine alteration and 
deletion of information that attends ordinary use,” something the Advisory Committee 
Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 describe as a “distinctive feature of computer 
operations.”28  Now it is common for at least one of the parties in litigation to have an 
email system that “is programmed with an automatic deletion feature that deletes any 
email after it has been in existence for sixty days.”29  Even “backup tapes” that capture 
                                                
26  See, e.g., Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(“[T]he obligation to preserve evidence even arises prior to the filing of a complaint where a party 
is on notice that litigation is likely to be commenced.”); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 
545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989) (sanctioning defendant for destroying documents despite knowledge of 
“impending” class action suit). 
27  Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 544, 566 (2003), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 407 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
28   Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(f) advisory committee’s note (2006) (recodified as Fed. R. Civ. P. 
36(e), April 30, 2007). 
29   Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 
2007); see also, Philip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1181 (D. 
Utah 2009) (“ASUSTeK informs its employees that any email not downloaded to an employee’s 





these data may eventually be subjected to deletion in the ordinary course of business.30  
So while the company effectively sends everything to the files upon its creation, this 
overbroad recordkeeping balances itself out over time through the process of automatic 
deletion—that is, unless a duty to preserve those records attaches because of a threatened 
subpoena or possible litigation.  In that case, the first step of presumptive record keeping 
is frozen in place, and the balancing out of deletion never happens.   
Thus, by the time of trial, the notion that a company truly kept most of its 
electronic records “in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” is illusory.  
Companies generally keep electronic records permanently either by physically printing 
documents and sending them to a document storage facility or through the process of 
electronic archival.  Even if a company implements an email retention policy designed to 
protect certain email folders from automatic deletion, that pre-set retention policy is 
rarely, if ever, revised, and often requires users to actually place emails in the correct 
folders.  If the individual/company does not take these steps, many records will 
eventually delete as a matter of course.31   
As one district court recently noted, some courts are “content to view electronic 
business records in the same light as traditional ‘hard copy’ records, and require only a 
rudimentary foundation.”32  Other courts have engaged in a more “demanding analysis” 
when applying Rule 803(6).33  Given that, in an email-driven world, there are now more 
written communications than ever before, and that businesses now retain these records 
differently from the past in both the short and long terms, the more rigorous approach 
seems necessary.  However, even courts applying the most demanding analysis have not 
addressed the impact of the duty to preserve electronically stored data on the application 
of Rule 803(6). 
                                                                                                                                            
computer are automatically overwritten to make room for additional email storage on 
ASUSTeK’s servers.”).   
30  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 314 (“Nightly backup 
tapes were kept for twenty working days, weekly tapes for one year, and monthly tapes for three 
years.  After the relevant time period elapsed, the tapes were recycled.”). 
31  The use of the record might impact the analysis of whether it is a business record 
pursuant to Rule 803(6).  For instance, a business may rely on a given type of record in the 
ordinary course of its business, but only for a relatively short period of time that falls within the 
window of time prior to automatic deletion.  In such a case, even if the record would disappear 
after a certain number of days, weeks, or months, one might argue that the record satisfies 
Rule 803(6). 
32  Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 574 (D. Md. 2007). 
33  Id. at 573. 





IV. APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION  
 As noted above, “[t]he touchstone of admissibility under Rule 803(6) is 
reliability.”34  Under certain circumstances, however, the premise of reliability is 
undermined, and the business records exception does not apply.  For example, many 
cases address the situation where someone created a record in anticipation of litigation.  
Courts generally have held that such records do not satisfy Rule 803(6) and that, unless 
another exception applies, they are inadmissible hearsay.  In Echo Acceptance Corp. v. 
Echosphere Corp.,35 for example, the Tenth Circuit court affirmed the lower court’s 
refusal to admit certain letters drafted by lawyers as business records, noting that “‘[i]t is 
well established that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not 
acting in the regular course of business.’”36  According to the court, “motivation of a 
record’s author is relevant to admissibility.”37 The self-serving motivation of the record 
preparer undermines the record’s trustworthiness.38   
While these cases address the circumstances of the creation of the record at issue, 
far fewer cases analyze the circumstances of how and why the record was “kept.”  As 
noted above, Rule 803(6) requires that the record be “kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity.”39   According to one district court, “[t]his requirement 
reflects the very basic principle that the mere presence of a document . . . in the retained 
files of a business entity do[es] not by itself qualify that document as a record of regularly 
                                                
34  Giles v. Rhodes, No. 94 Civ. 6385 (CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13980, at *25 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2000). 
35  Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Services, Inc., 267 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
36  Id. at 1091 (quoting Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 
(10th Cir. 1995)); see also Falco v. Alpha Affiliates, Inc., No. 97-494 MMS, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7480, at *47 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2000) (noting that “[o]ne of the requirements of Rule 803(6) 
is that the records be prepared in the ordinary course of business,” and that “[r]ecords that are 
prepared in anticipation of litigation do not fulfill this requirement”). 
37  Echo Acceptance, 267 F.3d at 1091. 
38  See, e.g., Thakore v. Univ. Machine, Inc., No. 05 C 5262, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88895, 
at *50 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) (“The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that reports prepared 
with an eye toward litigation, even though made in the course of the business’s operations, are not 
admissible under Rule 803(6).”); see also, e.g., Giles, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13980, at *25 
(“[C]ourts have consistently declined to admit incident reports prepared by prison guards 
involved in altercations with prisoners because of the self-serving nature of such reports in light 
of the writer’s inherent motivation to be less than accurate.”). 
39  Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 





conducted activity.”40  Rather, the particular record “must be kept as part of the usual 
course of business.”41  As the Ninth Circuit explained, “a record is considered as having 
been kept in the regular course of business when it is made pursuant to established 
procedures for the routine and timely making and preserving of business records, and is 
relied upon by the business in the performance of its functions.”42  But a company cannot 
rely on a record that it automatically deletes, which calls into question the reliability of 
such a record in the first place.  Where a business keeps a record solely because of 
impending litigation, and not as part of the everyday operation of that business, the 
business records exception should not apply.   
Today’s preservation issues apply to all electronically stored data, yet for the 
reasons discussed above, emails in particular are a uniquely modern form of business 
record and thus represent an even more compelling problem.  Among other things, they 
are written differently, sent differently, and saved differently than their hard copy 
predecessors.  Few cases specifically have addressed the admissibility of emails under the 
Rule 803(6) business records exception.  Those that have generally have focused on the 
motivation for and content of a given communication.  Where, if at all, courts have 
addressed the reasons why a given business ultimately “maintained” a particular email, 
they have recognized only two possibilities: it was the employee’s choice or it was the 
business’s policy to keep it.  No case has addressed the possibility that it was the 
opposing litigant’s decision to keep the email by triggering a duty of preservation.   
In New York v. Microsoft Corp., for example, the plaintiffs—numerous state 
attorneys general—argued that an email written by Rob Glaser of RealNetworks 
recounting a meeting between him and an employee of defendant Microsoft was 
admissible as a business record.43  The court held that “[w]hile Mr. Glaser’s email may 
have been ‘kept in the course’ of RealNetworks[’] regularly conducted business activity, 
Plaintiffs have not, on the present record, established that it was the ‘regular practice’ of 
RealNetworks employees to write and maintain such emails.”44  Thus, the court declined, 
“on this sparse record,” to treat the email account of the meeting as “a trustworthy 
business record.”45 
                                                
40  Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(quotations omitted) (analyzing Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11), but noting that “Rule 902(11) 
contains the same requirements, and almost the same wording, as Rule 803(6),” and that 
“decisions explaining the parallel provisions of Rule 803(6) are helpful in resolving [issues under 
Rule 902(11)]”). 
41  Id. 
42  United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 1983).   
43  New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *6 
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002). 
44  Id. at *9. 
45  Id. 





The lack of evidence showing that company employees followed a routine 
practice of preparing accounts of their meetings formed the underlying basis for the 
Microsoft court’s ruling.  The court started its analysis of Rule 803(6) with the 
observation that “[t]he justification for this exception is that business records have a high 
degree of accuracy because the nation’s business demands it, because the records are 
customarily checked for correctness, and because record keepers are trained in habits of 
precision.”46  Absent evidence that RealNetworks had a policy to prepare accounts of 
meetings like the one in the email at issue, the court questioned whether an isolated 
account could be considered trustworthy and borne of “precision.”   
According to the court, “the complete lack of information regarding the 
composition and maintenance of such emails invokes the final clause of Rule 803(6), 
which permits exclusion of the evidence where ‘the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.’”47  Supporting this statement, the court 
added in a parenthetical that “‘[a]bsence of routineness raises a lack of motivation to be 
accurate.’”48  Thus, the court focused on the content of the email itself, and on the 
supposed lack of trustworthiness of a record prepared at the employee’s discretion.    
The Microsoft court’s conclusion that Glaser’s email was “kept” in the course of 
business appears to beg the question.  Certainly, there is no analysis of whether this was 
true, as opposed to a logical inference taken from the existence of the email in his 
company’s files.  In any event, the court rejected the argument that the email was a 
business record.  Nevertheless, its detailed consideration of the “trustworthiness” of that 
and other emails appears incomplete because the court focused mainly on how and why 
someone created each record.  According to the court, “[p]laintiffs have not established 
the requisite foundation that the multiple authors of these emails each composed their 
portion of the document in the course of regularly conducted business activity and that it 
was the regular practice of RealNetworks to compose such email correspondence.”49  But 
the more basic question of why the records were kept might have provided resolution for 
this issue without any need for analyzing the specific content of each email.  Where 
litigants seek to introduce numerous emails as business records, such an approach could 
more efficiently (and correctly) decide the admissibility issue. 
As in Microsoft, the court in Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States questioned 
the reliability of emails created at an employee’s discretion.50  There, the Court of 
Federal Claims set out, in an “Evidence Appendix,” the substance of its oral orders on 
                                                
46  Id. at *8 (quotations omitted). 
47  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). 
48  Id. (quoting advisory committee’s note to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). 
49  New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683,at *19 
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002); see also id. (“Moreover, the multiple authors and forwarded nature of 
this series of emails undercuts the reliability of the information contained therein.”). 
50  55 Fed. Cl. 544, 566 (Ct. of Fed. Claims 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 407 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 





various exhibits.51  In the section of that appendix addressing “E-mails, Non-recurring 
Letters and Internal Memoranda,” the court noted that “documents that are created solely 
at the author’s discretion raise motivational concerns and lack the reliability and 
trustworthiness that business records are ordinarily assumed to have.”52  According to the 
court, “e-mails recounting telephone or hallway conversations or offering curbside 
opinions are too informal to satisfy the business records exception to hearsay.”53  They 
“do not have the formality of business purpose that appears to have been contemplated by 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6),” and the court thus ruled them inadmissible “because of their casual 
nature and because of the lack of obligation regularly to record meeting impressions or 
conversations.”54  Once again, the court’s application of Rule 803(6) to emails hinged 
almost exclusively on the circumstances of the records’ creation. 
The district court in United States v. Ferber also refused to admit certain emails 
as business records under Rule 803(6) largely due to concerns about the reliability of the 
emails that were not routinely prepared as part of the business’s operations.55  In that 
opinion, the court considered the admissibility of an email from a Merrill Lynch 
employee to his superior in which he recounted a conversation with financial 
advisor/investment banker Mark Ferber where Ferber “inculpated himself.”56 The 
government first argued that the email message was admissible as a business record 
pursuant to Rule 803(6).57  The court rejected this argument.58  As a threshold matter, the 
court noted that “[c]ourts admit hearsay statements which are grouped under Fed. R. 
Evid. 803 because of the supposed reliability of the out of court statements 
themselves.”59  The court then added that “[o]ne guarantee of that reliability is that the 
record was made in the course of a routine business practice.”60   
                                                
51  Id.. at 563. 
52  Id. at 566. 
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54  Id.; see also The Monotype Corp. PLC v. International Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 450 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“E-mail is an ongoing electronic message and retrieval system whereas an 
electronic inventory recording system is a regular, systematic function of a bookkeeper prepared 
in the course of business.”).   
55  United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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In Ferber, however, “while it may have been [the Merrill Lynch employee’s] 
routine business practice to make such records, there was no sufficient evidence that 
Merrill Lynch required such records to be maintained.”61  According to the court, “[t]his 
was fatal to the government’s proffer” of the email as a business record “because, in 
order for a document to be admitted as a business record, there must be some evidence of 
a business duty to make and regularly maintain records of this type.”62  Because the 
Merrill Lynch employee “was under no business duty to make and maintain these E-mail 
messages, and the evidence failed to show that Merrill Lynch itself followed such a 
routine,” the particular email at issue “did not qualify as a business record pursuant to 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).”63  “Were it otherwise,” wrote the court, “virtually any document 
found in the files of a business which pertained in any way to the functioning of that 
business would be admitted willy-nilly as a business record.  This is not the law.”64 
Perhaps because the Ferber court decided to admit the Merrill Lynch email as a 
present sense impression under Rule 803(1),65 thus rendering the discussion of Rule 
803(6) dicta, the court’s analysis of the business records exception is somewhat nebulous.  
The court did not list the elements necessary to satisfy the business records exception, 
and it is unclear what particular element or elements it was referring to in its analysis of 
whether the Merrill Lynch employee was under a business duty to “make and maintain” 
the emails at issue.  The reference to “maintain” might have been a reference to Rule 
803(6)’s requirement that the record be “kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity.”66  Even if it was, the court did not discuss any non-business reasons 
why the emails might have been maintained—for example, the attachment of a duty to 
preserve rather than employee choice or corporate policy.  However, based on the court’s 
statement that “[o]ne guarantee of that reliability is that the record was made in the 
course of a routine business practice,”67 it is more likely that the court was not focused 
on the “kept” prong of Rule 803(6) at all.  Rather, as in Microsoft, the Ferber court 
mainly seemed to want to distinguish a record that an employee simply decided to create 
from one that corporate policy dictated that he or she create.   
Indeed, that is how the district court in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies 
AG68 interpreted the Ferber court’s holding.  In Rambus, the plaintiff claimed that certain 
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documents were business records under Rule 803(6) and “offered purportedly 
authenticating declarations under Rule 902(11) in an effort to have them admitted.”69  
The court noted that “Rule 902(11) contains the same requirements, and almost the same 
wording, as Rule 803(6),” and thus that “decisions explaining the parallel provisions of 
Rule 803(6) are helpful in resolving the issues here presented.”70  Ferber was one such 
decision on which the Rambus court relied to interpret Rule 902(11).71  The Rambus 
court cited the case when holding that “it is not enough that a particular employee 
regularly makes and keeps the records as his or her own regular practice because it must 
be the regular practice of the business (e.g. the ‘regularly conducted activity’) to make 
and keep the record at issue.”72  According to the court, “that an employee ‘routinely’ 
takes meeting notes and keeps them, is quite different than whether a company policy 
directs the employee to do so.”73   
This discussion puts into focus the crux of Ferber’s ruling on the business records 
exception.  At its core, Ferber, like the few other cases that analyze the applicability of 
the business records exception to emails, focused on why someone created the record at 
issue—that is, whether the record was the product of an employee’s discretion or of 
corporate policy.  What the case did not do, and indeed what no case appears to have 
done, was approach the issue from a higher level of abstraction and discuss why the 
document remained in existence at the time of litigation.   
Of course, it is possible that the emails at issue in these cases were not subject to 
automatic deletion, or that for whatever reason their continued existence at the time of 
litigation was due to business reasons rather than to a preservation duty in anticipation of 
litigation.  It is noteworthy, though, that the few cases to provide a detailed discussion of 
whether emails are business records have not mentioned preservation obligations at all.  
One can easily see how a court might assume that a record that is present in a business’s 
files was “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,” and thus 
advance to the next element in Rule 803(6) regarding why the record was made.  But this 
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key prong of Rule 803(6) requires more scrutiny in light of the role that preservation 
obligations play in the continued existence of most electronic records. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today, there are exponentially more written communications between workers 
than ever before.  A duty to preserve electronic records means the scale of document 
productions has exploded, and will continue to grow.  The document production in a 
large case even twenty years ago might only have filled a conference room’s worth of 
boxes.  Now, companies commonly produce millions of pages of documents in response 
to a government subpoena or civil document request.  Of course, a duty to preserve 
materials in anticipation of a government subpoena or litigation existed before email 
became the main form of workplace communication.  But too little attention has been 
paid to exactly why businesses keep the records they have. 
The increased number of materials preserved and produced in a given matter has 
brought many more records within the possible scope of the Rule 803(6) business records 
hearsay exception.  In the hard copy age, however, the existence of workplace 
correspondence in the company’s files was more meaningful than it is today.  It was 
much easier to infer from their mere presence in the company files that records 
demonstrated the reliability and trustworthiness of documents prepared and relied upon 
by the business in the ordinary course of its affairs.  In the electronic age, the existence of 
a business record in the company files, even if someone created the record in the regular 
course of the company’s business, might mean very little.  The act of sending or 
receiving an email puts it in the company’s files as a matter of course, having nothing to 
do with the particular business activity per se.  Once the duty to preserve attaches, the 
company cannot throw these records away, even though that would have been its typical 
practice. 
Thus, there is a very real question of whether an email in the business’s files at 
the time of litigation was actually “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity.”74  Millions of emails that the company otherwise would have deleted in the 
ordinary course of its business now might be kept only in anticipation of litigation.  Even 
as server storage space grows, or more records can be housed “in the cloud,”75 the issue 
will remain as to why exactly a given record remains in the business’s files.  Is it because 
the business wanted or needed to use that record?  Or is it simply the result of a 
preservation obligation or technological happenstance?   
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Because it suits them, the government and other litigants often would like to avoid 
this analysis and to sweep into evidence as many documents as possible under the 
umbrella of “business records.”  Broad admissibility makes their lives easier, providing a 
fully loaded quiver from which they can pull individual helpful documents as the 
circumstances dictate at trial.  But this serves little purpose other than to accommodate 
lawyers’ extreme desire to hedge, to put off limiting their options as long as possible out 
of fear that that choice someday might be proven wrong.  Courts should force parties to 
demonstrate the admissibility of each document they seek to admit into evidence.  They 
should not permit Rule 803(6) to function as some sort of evidentiary safe-harbor for any 
document pulled from the business’s files.    
So far, even the courts that have engaged in the most comprehensive analyses of 
whether emails are admissible business records have not addressed why those emails 
existed for the court’s consideration in the first place.  These courts typically have 
focused on the reasons why someone created a given email, and distinguished records the 
employee made and kept at his or her discretion from those that the employee created and 
kept pursuant to business policy.76  But a business’s presumptive deletion of a record 
would seem much more likely to undercut its reliability and trustworthiness than the mere 
fact that an employee independently thought a work-related record was necessary to 
create and keep.   
Because the duty to preserve evidence now plays such a fundamental role in the 
continued existence of certain records, the “kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity” prong of Rule 803(6) requires a more complex analysis than it once 
did.  Indeed, it seems much more difficult today to show that an electronic record that a 
business typically would delete after a period of time actually was made “pursuant to 
established procedures for the . . . preserving of business records,” and was “relied upon 
by the business in the performance of its functions.”77  Given that “[t]he touchstone of 
admissibility under Rule 803(6) is reliability,”78 courts at the very least should consider 
how reliable a record really is when the business’s typical practice would be to delete it 
as a matter of course.  
In conclusion, technology has not just changed how we communicate with one 
another; it has changed how we keep and throw away those communications.  That does 
not mean that every preserved record fails to satisfy Rule 803(6)’s requirements.  But 
courts must scrutinize the special circumstances that exist in today’s electronic age to 
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